Engagement, Expression, and Initiation

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Abstract According to what has been called a "Transformational" account of education, a child comes to possess rational and conceptual capacities as a result of initiation into culture or a "form of life." I consider how we must understand the engagement with other minds involved in education if we are to make sense of the Transformational view. I argue that Wittgenstein's discussions of perceiving and mimicking other minds provide the resources to respond to worries one might have with the idea that a genuine meeting of minds can occur in education prior to the acquisition of sophisticated capacities for reasoning.

Keywords Wittgenstein · Education · Other minds · Expression · Mindreading

1 Initiation and the Meeting of Minds

Education involves a meeting and shaping of minds. On a view associated with the later Wittgenstein, which, following others (Bakhurst 2011), I will call a Transformational view, education is also responsible for the *creation* of minds. As John McDowell puts it, learning our first language is not merely a matter of coming to possess a means for expressing independently intelligible thoughts, but is, instead, "the same thing as acquiring a mind, the capacity to think and act intentionally" (McDowell 1994: 126). Interpreting Vygotsky, Meredith Williams writes that "[higher] mental functions are the product of social interaction in such a way that they cannot be characterized independently of that interaction" (Williams 1999: 262). David Bakhurst writes that "we owe our status as rational animals to our initiation into culture" (Bakhurst 2011: xiii). As the point is often put using

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Wittgenstein's imagery, we come to possess rational and conceptual capacities by being initiated into a form of life.[1]

Claiming that education is both a meeting of minds and the creation of minds has an air of paradox to it, since, of course, there cannot be a mind with which to meet prior to its own creation. Here are three ways one might respond to the seeming paradox. First, one might hold that there are really two kinds of education in play: that which involves a genuine meeting of minds, the kind of education with which we are most familiar, and that which does not, what Wittgenstein sometimes refers to with the word "abrichten," akin to the training of an animal. This is a familiar Empiricist model of learning. Otherwise, one might hold that two forms of mindedness are in play. On this view, education creates a species of mindedness, the kind at play in inquiry, in which sophisticated rational and conceptual capacities are exercised. This leaves in place the idea that prior to initiation into a form of life children possess another form of mindedness and that a meeting of minds does occur. The third option is, of course, to take the paradox at face value and to conclude that the Transformational view must be mistaken. This is a familiar Rationalist theory of learning on which we must always already credit the pupil with rational capacities in order to make sense of education.[2]

My goal in this paper is to explore the second option above and to consider how we must understand the engagement with other minds involved in education if we are to make sense of the Transformational view. The question I want to address here is the following: How is it possible that a child could enter into an educational encounter, engaging in a genuine meeting of minds, prior to her possession of sophisticated capacities for reasoning? I'll argue that there are really two difficulties here and that different strands in Wittgenstein's discussions of our engagement with other minds can help us to resolve them.

2   The Transformational View

The first thing to get clear on is exactly what the Transformational view holds, since it can be difficult to state without lapsing into absurdity or triviality. It would be absurd to deny that human beings have, as part of their natural endowments, the ability to come to reason and learn language. Likewise, it would be absurd to deny that creatures that have not been initiated into a linguistic community cannot reason

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[1]Readers of Wittgenstein who attribute the Transformational view to him include McDowell (1994), Williams (1999, 2010), Huemer (2006), Stickney (2008a, b), Smeyers (2008), and Bakhurst (2011). This attribution is challenged by Luntley (2008, 2009). I won't address the interpretive question here.

[2]According to Luntley, a Rationalist, we must "acknowledge that the learner can only respond to training if they already possess sufficient mental equipment to generate the appropriate responses" (Luntley 2008: 695). Luntley (2009) uses the labels "Empiricist" and "Rationalist" in a similar way.

or process information about their environments, at least in some rudimentary sense. Thus, when its defenders claim that initiation endows the pupil with a mind, they must mean some species of mindedness. And it is trivial that caregivers and the broader linguistic community play a causal enabling role in a child's development of rational and conceptual capacities. Likewise, it is trivial that many concepts (for example, the concepts involved in games like chess) could not be possessed unless one was initiated into a particular form of life. So how does the view go beyond these trivialities while avoiding absurdity?

It is useful here to consider Sellars' famous remark:

> [I]n characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. (Sellars 1963, §36)

Sellars' focus here is knowledge, but the point generalizes to things done for reasons, including the use of words. When a subject occupies a position in the space of reasons, for example by referring to an object with a name, by making a claim about objects in her environment, by forming a belief, or by acting for a reason, she does so on the basis of her own assessment of the appropriateness of doing so. Such a move manifests reason in the demanding sense that it realizes her capacity to be moved by what she herself takes to be reasons, rather than the operations of some subpersonal part of her.[3]

This characterization is vague, of course, but it is sufficient for our purposes. The Transformational view holds that mindedness is achieved through initiation into a form of life. If the form of mindedness in question is that manifest in making moves in the space of reasons, then we need not deny outright that creatures without language or humans prior to initiation into a form of life lack minds, nor need we deny that humans are born capable of developing rational capacities by means of initiation. The Transformational view requires only that such initiation is constitutive of and necessary for that development. Such a view is clearly more robust than the platitudes about the causal enabling role of caregivers or the idea that some concepts are socially constructed.[4]

How the details get filled in will depend upon how one understands conceptual and rational capacities. But the basic thought is that through engagement with others the child becomes capable of entertaining abstract thoughts by decontextualizing representations from her concrete environment and engaging in sophisticated forms of reasoning.[5] By "sophisticated forms of reasoning" and abstract thought I mean such cognitive achievements as drawing causal inferences about

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[3]Luntley (2009) and Bakhurst (2011) also frame the question facing the Transformative view in terms of the child's entrance into the space of reasons.

[4]The Transformational view should not be interpreted as holding that all concepts are socially constructed, though. See Bakhurst (2011), Chap. 3 for a helpful discussion.

[5]See Bakhurst (2011), Chap. 1 and Williams (1999) for further discussion of this process.

unobservable objects and operating with concepts defined in terms of other concepts. Children are bootstrapped into these sophisticated modes of thought because their caregivers put in place a structure and environment in which they (the children) are able to take advantage of what McDowell calls "a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what" (McDowell 1994: 126). On the Transformational view, then, rational and conceptual abilities are inheritances of culture. The question that we are considering is what abilities on the part of the pupil must be presupposed in order for this inheritance to occur.

3   Meeting of Minds

What do we mean by a meeting of minds? Often we mean a mutual or shared awareness of another's mind as directed at some joint venture or feature of the shared environment. To say that education involves a meeting of minds is just to say that it is a joint venture between pupil and teacher that arises as a result of mutual understanding of intentions and other mental states and that through this mutual understanding the pupil is able to come to see things as the teacher does. If initiation into a form of life is a meeting of minds, then it too must involve, on the part of the pupil, both an awareness of the other's mind and an act of taking on the perspective of the other, seeing things and responding to them as she does. These two aspects of a meeting of minds raise difficulties for the Transformational view.

Imagine a language game played with a small child involving the word "cat." Suppose the child is visiting relatives and encounters a cat for the first time. When the cat comes into view, the child is transfixed. Her parents point at it or bring it near and say "cat." Now two things are worth emphasizing here. First, the child does not have a grasp on what cats are prior to learning the game and, second, the child's grasp on what cats are will be shaped, at this early stage, by what her parents and she do with the cat. If the cat is rabid, the parents especially protective, or the child allergic, then calling out "cat!" will sound a note of warning. This game will involve calling attention to something the child should flee from or perhaps fear. Knowing what cats are, here, will require knowing them as things to be avoided. Competence in this basic game requires both that the child become aware of the parent's intentions concerning the cat and that she, in turn, attend to and respond to the cat in the same manner.

Education as a meeting of minds involves awareness of other minds and internalizing another's perspective. This raises difficulties for the Transformational view, since it is natural to suppose that both acts on the part of the pupil must involve   sophisticated   reasoning.   There,   then,   two   objections   to   the Transformational view I want to consider, both straightforward. First, if education involves a meeting of minds, then the pupil or initiate must, in entering into an educational encounter, be aware of other minds. If the mental states of others are "hidden" behind behavior, then the pupil could only gain awareness of those states by means of inference. It would follow that education presupposes the capacity for

inference; hence, education cannot endow the pupil with such a capacity, as the Transformational view holds. Second, initiation into a form of life involves the child inheriting a point of view from her teachers by responding to and accepting an invitation from the teacher to do so, as described above. But it is difficult to see how taking up an invitation to see things a certain way could be anything other than an act of reason (Luntley 2008). I discuss awareness of minds first and then move to taking up another's point of view.

A meeting of minds presupposes awareness of the other's mind. On the dominant view mindreading is achieved by means of inference. Consider the following representative remark:

> Because the mental states of others (and indeed of ourselves) are completely hidden from the senses, they can only ever be inferred. Thinking about these unobservable states is a subtle business indeed, but in one way or another an essential part of our social life. (Leslie 1987: 139)

In a similar spirit, Sartre writes of the other that it is "only the outer shell which I possess" (Sartre 1943: 511). To gain knowledge of what lies beneath that shell requires reasoning about causes. There is disagreement in the literature about the form these inferences are supposed to take. According to Simulationism, one ascribes a mental state to another after simulating what mental state one would oneself experience were one to exhibit similar behavior or find oneself in similar circumstances (Goldman 2006). According to the "Theory Theory," mental state ascriptions derive from a folk theory about how invisible mental states, understood as theoretical entities, are causally related to behavior (Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). But for our purposes what matters is what these approaches agree on: Awareness of another's mind is a result of observing behavior and drawing inferences about the unobservable mental states that cause it.

An inferential epistemology of other minds raises problems for the Transformational view because the following three claims are inconsistent:

Inferentialism: Knowledge of other minds is achieved by inference from observations of behavior.
Meeting: Education involves a meeting of minds and so presupposes the pupil's capacity for mindreading.
Transformational View: Education endows the pupil with capacities for reasoning and conceptual thought.

If education is a meeting of minds, then the pupil must already possess, to some degree, the capacity for mindreading. By Inferentialism, that capacity is the capacity for reasoning. But that means that education could not equip the pupil with that capacity, as the Transformational view has it.[6]

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[6]It won't help to insist that, according to its advocates, the analogical and theoretical reasoning involved are implicit. If education is a meeting of minds, then it involves personal level awareness on the part of the pupil. If minds are hidden, as Inferentialists hold, then this awareness must be mediated by inferences.

A natural response is to reject meeting on the ground that it overintellectualizes the achievements of the initiate and leaves no room for the Transformational view. Instead, we ought to distinguish education that involves reasoning from the training of the initiate. Earlier I referred to this as an Empiricist model of learning. Wittgenstein is often read as opting for this solution, and for good reason (Huemer 2006; Williams 2010). By the way of clarifying his use of the word "training," he writes:

> I am using the word 'trained' in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things. It is done by means of example, reward, punishment, and suchlike. (BB, 77)[7]

Wittgenstein seems to draw a sharp contrast between training and teaching, where the latter consists in reasoning with the pupil and offering explanations and the former is more like conditioning (Huemer 2006). Conditioning is nonrational and presupposes little awareness on the part of the pupil. "[T]he child, I should like to say, learns to react in such and such a way; and in so reacting it doesn't so far know anything. Knowing only begins at a later level" (OC §538). If initiation into a form of life consists in training and this is understood as a form of conditioning, then it would be out of place to think that initiation into a form of life involves a meeting of minds.

However, regardless of whether we attribute it to Wittgenstein, we should reject this Empiricist view, which implausibly portrays the child as a passive recipient.[8] It is difficult if not impossible to understand how a process of conditioning can result in anything other than rigid dispositions to respond to what has been confronted before. But initiation into a form of life endows the child with the ability to creatively and intelligently apply concepts in novel circumstances while being guided by what she has been taught before. That is, unless the child is actively engaged from the beginning, it is very difficult to see how she could come to exhibit what Michael Luntley calls "responsible creativity" (Luntley 2009: 697). We want our account of education to portray the initiate as active and engaged with her teacher in a genuine meeting of minds. We should hold onto the thesis I called Meeting. It follows that defenders of the Transformational view must reject Inferentialism about other minds. I think Wittgenstein offers a way of doing this, to which I turn in the next sections.

One might reject the way I have framed the issues here for the following reason. On the Transformational view our reason responsiveness is an endowment of education. But reason responsiveness comes in inferential and non-inferential forms.

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[7]Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = Philosophical Investigations, BBB = The Blue and Brown Book, OC = On Certainty, RPP I = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, RPP II = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology II, Z = Zettel), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials in the References.

[8]I do not read Wittgenstein's harsh use of the word "training" to commit him to a version of Empiricism, but, as mentioned, I won't take up the point here.

So the difficulty of combining the Transformational view with the thesis I called Meeting relies only on the idea that a meeting of minds involves knowledge, of whatever kind, and so presupposes an ability to respond to reasons. Inferentialism is a red herring.

But this would be too quick. As noted earlier, defenders of the Transformational view must make room for forms of mindedness lacking sophisticated rational capacities. The Transformational view holds that this form of mindedness is different in kind from genuine reason responsiveness and that the latter is an achievement resulting from initiation. This leaves room for the idea that the process of initiation exploits the child's awareness of her environment. The question is whether the minds of others can figure in that awareness. If awareness of other minds is only achieved by means of inference, then it could not figure in the initiate's awareness, understood along the lines of the Transformational view. So Inferentialism is a serious obstacle to the plausibility of that view.

4   Perceiving Minds

That Wittgenstein rejects Inferentialism about other minds is well known. Consider the following remarks.

> In general I do not surmise fear in him—I *see* it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside… (RPP II, §170)

> Consciousness in another's face. Look into someone else's face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular *shade* of consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so on. The light in other people's faces. Do you look into *yourself* in order to recognize the fury in *his* face? It is there as clearly as in your own breast. (And what does one want to say? That someone else's face stimulates me to imitate it, and so that I feel small movements and muscular tensions on my own part, and *mean* the sum of these? Nonsense! Nonsense! —for you are making suppositions instead of just describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you will neglect to bear in mind the facts which are most important.) (RPP I, §927)

Remarks like these run throughout the later works.[9] As I understand it, the view is as follows. Attention to plain facts and reflection on our actual interactions with others reveal that we often perceive the mental states of others directly by observing expressive behavior. When a person grits her teeth, gets red in the face, or shouts, her anger is thereby something that I can observe. We engage in neither inference nor simulation in order to arrive at mental state ascriptions since the pains, emotions, and other mental states of others are in plain view for us. To suppose otherwise is to be gripped by a view of what mental states *must* be like—hidden

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[9]See also PI §244, PI §284, RPP1 §1070, Z §225, Z §472, for a start.

internal items—rather than attention to how we actually interact with others. I take this to mean that, for Wittgenstein, it would be wrong to think of his perceptual view as a bit of psychological theorizing. Instead, he asks us to consider an experience of confronting an angry face. When we do this, we should realize that it is extremely difficult and unnatural to describe what we are presented with other than mentalistically. Hence, what we are presented with in these remarks is a series of descriptions and reflections that remind us that we are not forced to accept the Inferential view.

Given that this is how Wittgenstein conceives of the dialectic, it would be misguided to expect him to offer anything like a theory of either expression or the perception of mental states. Whether that is the right way to see things is unclear. One might think that however natural it is to talk of "seeing anger in another's face" it is far from clear that such talk is not metaphorical or elliptical. Thus, one might think, against Wittgenstein, that we are owed an explanation before we accept the perceptual view, for example, an explanation of the relation between mental states and expressive behavior. I want to remain neutral about this. That is because our concern is not with defending the perceptual view in detail but rather determining whether that view can be put in the service of the Transformational account of education. I'll consider two reasons for thinking it cannot, one concerning the scope of the perceptual view and another concerning whether the idea of perceiving mental states is sufficient to account for a meeting of minds. I'll discuss the first in the rest of this section and consider the second in the next section.

The worry is as follows: In order to grasp meanings through initiation, the child must become aware of the intentions of her teachers. However, insofar as it is at all plausible that we perceive mental states, this is restricted to states like emotions or pains. Intentions cannot be perceived. Therefore, the perceptual view cannot be put in the service of the Transformational view.

Interestingly, this is a point on which Wittgenstein and Anscombe disagreed. Wittgenstein holds that intentions can be perceived by observing their natural expressions. He writes: "What is the natural expression of an intention?—Look at a cat when it stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape" (PI §647). By contrast, in *Intention* Anscombe claims that "intention appears to be something that we can express, but which brutes (which e.g. do not give orders) can *have,* though lacking any distinct expression of intention" (Anscombe 2000: 5). We cannot perceive intentions because there cannot be natural expressions of intention in non-linguistic behavior. One thing that Anscombe might have been thinking is that an intention picks out an action under a particular description and nothing in one's non-linguistic behavior could do that. Suppose a cat stalks a bird before leaping up to a bird bath, splashing, and then grabbing it. Presumably the cat does not splash in the bath *intentionally* yet it is hard to see how anything in the stalking behavior could rule that out (or let it in if it was indeed a part of the cat's intention). In short, a limitation of expressive behavior is that it is too coarse-grained to show the intentional object of a mental state.

Here are three quick responses. First, in the case of intention, the object is just the action, which can often be observed. Now it seems clear that the intentional

object might not always be on display: You might observe a cat stalking and not see the bird it is heading toward; hence, you could not take the behavior as an expression of the intention to stalk *that* bird. But that seems to leave in place the idea that distinctive gestures or patterns of behavior might count as expressions of intentions to stalk, flee, and so on. Second, we started with the thought that if any mental states can be perceived, then emotions can. But emotions are often expressed in a way that also embodies one's intentions. My fear of the cat might be expressed by the way I cautiously step back from it, revealing also my intention to avoid it. It may, then, be wrong to drive a wedge between emotions and intentions here. Third prelinguistic children are able to detect and respond to playful behavior, which suggests they respond to expressions of intentions to play (Reddy 2008).

Nevertheless, it should be uncontroversial that there are not natural expressions of belief and that initiate learners cannot become aware of another's beliefs by observation. And there is sound empirical evidence—the "false belief test"—that indicates that children do not possess the concept of belief before they possess relatively sophisticated capacities for causal reasoning. If this is right, then the meeting of minds involved in initiation into a form of life must not require that the pupil grasp the beliefs of the teacher. That might sound surprising. It is certainly something the Transformational view must be able to explain. I will return to it at the end of the next section.

5   Mimicking and Sharing

As we have seen, the Transformational view can only be a plausible account of initiate learning if there is non-inferential awareness of other minds. Wittgenstein holds that there is such awareness and warns us that it is a result of forgetting plain facts to think otherwise. Granting this, we might still ask whether non-inferential awareness of other minds is enough to make possible the meeting of minds involved in initiation into a form of life.

We have already seen reason to suppose it is not. Earlier I claimed that for a meeting of minds to result in a child's competence in a language-game she must be able to take on the point of view of her caregivers, inheriting their outlook and concepts. Grasping that the other has a particular point of view is necessary for this achievement, but not sufficient. Obviously, one can recognize that another sees things a certain way but refrain from agreeing. In addition to awareness here, it would seem that a kind of decision is required. The pupil must recognize the teacher's invitation to see things a certain way and accept this invitation on the basis of her assessment of the invitation's merit. But this would seem to be a matter of reasoning on behalf of the pupil. So it looks like initiation into a form of life presupposes rational capacities even if other minds are observable features of our environments.

But we should not take the perceptual view of other minds as a complete model for engagement. Doing so invites us to think of education as a matter of a child internalizing what she recognizes as an external sign by means of rational acceptance. But perhaps the picture of internalization as rational acceptance is overly intellectualized. Clearly it must be if the Transformational view is correct. But what alternative is there?

In addition to his discussions on perceiving other minds, Wittgenstein emphasized the connection between our awareness of other minds and our propensity to mimic and share mental states.

> If someone sees a smile and does not know it for a smile, does not understand it as such, does he see it differently from someone else who understands it? – He mimics it differently, for instance.

> Hold the drawing of a face upside down and you can't recognize the expression of the face. Perhaps you can see that it is smiling, but not exactly what kind of smile it is. You cannot imitate the smile or describe it more exactly. (PI, Pt. II, p. 198)

> 'I see that the child wants to touch the dog, but doesn't dare'. How can I see that? – Is this description of what is seen on the same level as a description of moving shapes and colors? Is an interpretation in question? Well, remember that you may also mimic a human being who would like to touch something but doesn't dare. (RPP1 §1066)

According to Wittgenstein, when we are confronted with a smiling face the most natural description of what we are confronted with is mentalistic: We see happiness rather than a mouth turned up at a certain angle. But, of course, one could represent another's face in those terms. Wittgenstein's preoccupation throughout the discussion of mimicry is to understand what the difference is between representing faces mentalistically and not. If someone could not see a face as happy, then in mimicking it he would attempt to shape his mouth to mirror the angles and proportions of the other's face. (It would no doubt be quite an awkward enterprise.) But if I see your face as happy, then in mimicking it I will express happiness myself. As the first quoted passage suggests, Wittgenstein thinks that our ability to come up with apt descriptions of other minds is caught up in our ability to imitate them. How exactly might this work and how might it bear on the difficulties facing the Transformational view?

The quoted passages show that Wittgenstein does not think of our capacity for imitation as a means for drawing theoretical inferences ("interpretation"). We also know that he rejects the idea that we arrive at mental state ascriptions through analogical reasoning. It is natural to wonder how else imitation might aid in our awareness of other minds. Here is a suggestion. Our ability to imitate others aids our understanding of their minds because it exploits our natural ability to *identify with* and *share* mental states. A good imitation of a joyful smile is not achieved by some kind of contortion, but simply by expressing joy oneself. As he suggests throughout the discussion of smiling in particular, our awareness of another's joy is

achieved through our smiling. If this is not simulation, then it must draw on a propensity to genuinely share another's mental states.

This is relevant to the Transformational view because this capacity is also plausibly at play in initiate learning. Consider again the game with the cat. The child, mystified by the new creature, looks to her parents for guidance. The parents respond in fear, discomfort, and so on. These expressions are manifest for the child and also serve as a kind of commentary on the cat.[10] As we might put it, the parents' expressions of fear are a kind of proto-judgment to the effect that the cat is dangerous and to be avoided. If the child is naturally attuned to the emotions and intentions of her parents, then she will be disposed to share in these attitudes and thereby take on board the relevant commentary. So the transmission of outlook that constitutes initiation into a form of life is achieved, at this early stage, without complex reasoning or abstract thought. This capacity is exercised in mimicking another's face without analogical or inferential mediation.[11]

Imitation is neither a result nor a stage in reasoning. It is instead what Wittgenstein calls a "primitive reaction. "

> It is a help here to remember that it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain…

> But what is the word "primitive" meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought. (Z §540–41)

If internalization of a point of view was a form of rational acceptance, then it would be a move within a language game already in place. But these reactions and this attunement are "primitive" in Wittgenstein's terms because they are not the result of reasoning.[12] The child naturally desires to be like her caregivers and is disposed to share their reactions. Internalization of commentary, (e.g. that the cat is to be feared and avoided) is not a matter of rational acceptance of something grasped prior to internalization. The reverse is the case: The child grasps the commentary by internalizing the emotion that embodies it.

If we supplement a perceptual epistemology of other minds with an account of imitation and sharing mental states as primitive reactions, we have the resources for a full-blooded picture of a meeting of minds prior to the acquisition of rational capacities. This view has two other benefits worth mentioning. First, it can make sense of what remained puzzling from our discussion of the perceptual epistemology of other minds. There are not natural expressions of belief, hence, no way for prelinguistic children to grasp the beliefs of others. That made it look mysterious

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[10]The idea that expressions of emotion serve as a commentary on the shared environment is mentioned by Roessler (2006).

[11]If this is Wittgenstein's view, then he must think that the same capacity at play in initiate learning is exercised in our mature knowledge of other minds, which is an intriguing suggestion.

[12]The place of primitive, animal reactions in education is emphasized in Stickney (2008a).

how perception could aid in a child's acceptance of another person's outlook. On the present view the pupil need not become aware of her teacher's beliefs in order to enter into the language game. That is because the process of accepting another's point of view occurs without the question of divergences of perspective arising at all. In order for a shared perspective to arise there must be agreement, but this can occur without the child's grasping the possibility of disagreement. Second, the view may help us to understand what Wittgenstein had in mind when he wrote that, "[i]f language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments" (PI §242).[13] The suggestion is that the agreement in judgments can be achieved by the kind of sharing of outlook described here, an agreement that draws only on primitive, natural reactions, and which forms the foundation of language games.

6 Conclusion

My goal in this paper has been to raise an objection against the Transformational account of education and to sketch an account of engagement with other minds that can meet it. At a minimum, I hope to have shown that those sympathetic to the Transformational view ought to take seriously the question of how we engage other minds. The crude idea of training so often invoked will not suffice, no matter how often one chants the mantra about the dawning of light on the whole (OC §141). It is also not enough here to appeal to a perceptual epistemology of other minds of the kind endorsed by Wittgenstein, intriguing and important as that is. The focus on education as *engagement* with other minds makes this clear. Instead, we must take seriously and try to understand the picture of engagement hinted at in Wittgenstein's suggestive remarks about imitation, mimicry, and primitive reactions to the minds of others. Our capacity to mimic exploits our natural tendency to share and identify with the minds of others. It is this natural, primitive attunement that allows for initiation into a form of life and the development of rational capacities.

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[13]Thanks to Jeff Stickney for drawing my attention to the relevance of this passage.

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