I am a Visiting Assistant Professor in the department of philosophy at Binghamton University (SUNY). I previously held an EU mobility research fellowship at the University of Hradec Králové in the Czech Republic and a Junior Research Fellowship at St Hilda's College, University of Oxford. My main interests lie at the intersections of epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind. Most of my work is on self-knowledge.

I'm especially interested in the propriety of forming beliefs about our own mind and other minds by particular methods. For example, when it comes to knowing your own beliefs, desires, and emotions it seems important to rely on yourself, rather than putting your trust in others. (This is called "Pessimism" about testimony as a source of self-knowledge. It is an important tenet of much talk therapy.) And when you speak about your own mind there is a presumption that what you say is true, a presumption that doesn't obtain when you speak about another's mind. This places a demand on others when forming beliefs about your mind. (This is called "first-person authority". It is an important norm structuring our social interactions.) In my research I have attempted to specify these phenomena and explain them, as well as to consider other broadly ethical dimensions of how we know our own and other minds.

Other topics I'm interested in: perception, mental agency, love, hope, conscience, and moral knowledge. Historical interests include Kant, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Ryle, and Murdoch.

I received my BA in philosophy from Bates College in Lewiston, Maine and my PhD from the University of Pittsburgh. My dissertation was titled "Four Essays on Self-Knowledge" because that's what it was. My supervisors were John McDowell and Kieran Setiya.